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Abstract	
 
Is there a ‘common element’ in Buddhist ethical thought from which one might 
rationally reconstruct a Buddhist normative ethical theory? Many construe this as the 
question: which contemporary normative theory does Buddhist ethics best 
approximate; consequentialism or virtue ethics? This paper will argue that two distinct 
evaluative relations underlie these distinct positions; an instrumental and constitutive 
analysis. It will raise some difficulties for linking these distinct analyses to particular 
normative ethical theories but will give reasons to think that both may be justified as 
meta-ethical grounds for rationally reconstructing Buddhist thought as an ethical 
theory. It will close with some reflections on the complexity involved in trying to 
establish a single and homogeneous position on the nature of Buddhist ethics. 
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Is there a ‘common element’ in Buddhist ethical thought from which one might 
rationally reconstruct a Buddhist normative ethical theory?  
Each Buddhist philosophical tradition and each Buddhist practitioner seeks to 
be consistent with the Buddha’s teachings. Central to the Buddha’s teachings were the 
Four Noble Truths. They are the truths of or about suffering (duḥkha), the causes of 
suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the pathway to the cessation of suffering; 
viz. the Eightfold Path. The Eightfold Path consists of right view, right intention, right 
speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right 
concentration. This might naturally suggest a ‘common element’ from which one 
might rationally reconstruct a Buddhist normative ethical theory. There is much 
disagreement, however, about what this common starting point entails. Some 
emphasize the relation between the first and third noble truths and argue that Buddhist 
                                                
1 Many thanks to Koji Tanaka for substantive input on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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ethics is best construed in consequentialist terms. 2  On this view, an application, 
violation or revision of moral rules of conduct is ethically adjudicated relative to 
whether it (directly or indirectly) causes the cessation of suffering. Others emphasize 
those elements of the Eightfold Path that call for the cultivation and expression of 
various attitudes and states of mind and argue that Buddhist ethics is better theorized 
as a form of virtue ethics.3 On this view, an application, violation or revision of moral 
rules of conduct is ethically adjudicated relative to the attitude, quality or state of 
mind thereby expressed. Some, insist that no version of virtue ethics can provide a 
viable reconstruction of Buddhist ethics. 4  Others, that Buddhist ethics cannot be 
consequentialist.5 And yet others argue for integrating these theories into some form 
of virtue consequentialism.6 
This paper will argue that underlying these distinct positions are at least two 
distinct ways of thinking about the nature of a path relative to a goal and thus two 
ways of conceiving the relation between the Eightfold Path and the goal of the Four 
Noble Truths. The first is, what I will call, an instrumental analysis and the second a 
constitutive analysis. The terms ‘instrumental’ and ‘constitutive’ are not new to 
Buddhist ethics literature, although they are typically unanalysed and tend to be 
respectively associated with utilitarianism and virtue ethics.7 I will closely analyse 
these notions and demonstrate how they provide for two distinct meta-ethical 
accounts of the normative grounds of Buddhist Ethics. I will then raise some 
difficulties for linking these evaluative relations with particular normative theories 
                                                
2 see Goodman (2008), Siderits (2003; 2007), Williams (1998) 
3 see Keown (2001), Cooper & James (2005)  
4 see Kalupahana (1976: 60), Goodman (2009, 2013), Siderits (2015) 
5 Or, at least, cannot be utilitarian; see Keown (2001:177) 
6 see Clayton (2006) 
7 The most focused discussion of this distinction can be found in Dreyfus (1995), who employs it to 
articulate a virtue ethical analysis of Buddhist thought. The distinction can also be found in Keown 
(2001) and Clayton (2006).   
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and will propose, instead, to set aside the normative labels and focus on the evaluative 
relations themselves.  
I will then turn to the question of whether one or other meta-ethical analysis 
better captures the spirit underlying Buddhist ethical thought. I will suggest that three 
criteria would need to be satisfied by a plausible reconstruction of Buddhist thought 
as an ethical theory and I will give reasons to think that at least the first and third of 
these criteria might be satisfied by both the instrumental and constitutive analyses of 
the Buddhist path.8  While this paper will not go so far as to establish that both 
analyses are equally legitimate, it will demonstrate that the tensions between these 
competing rational reconstructions are sufficiently complex to resist an easy 
resolution into a singular and homogeneous position on the nature of Buddhist ethics. 
 
An	Instrumental	Analysis	of	the	Buddhist	Path	
Defenders of consequentialist reconstructions of Buddhist ethics typically emphasise 
the cessation of suffering as the central and ultimate goal of Buddhist practice. While 
Buddhist texts may enjoin various actions, qualities and practices, their evaluative 
status is thought to be ultimately justified in terms of their function in generating 
(producing, causing) the cessation of suffering. A traditional way of reconstructing 
this justificatory ground in normative ethical terms is as a (negative) form of 
utilitarianism.9 This reconstruction presupposes an instrumental analysis of evaluative 
status that is broadly supervenient on causation. That is to say, the normative 
properties of actions, attitudes and qualities of agents are conceived as depending only 
on whether they are means to some valued end and they do not count as means to that 
                                                
8 I also believe that the second can be satisfied by both analyses but shall not argue the point in this 
paper. 
9 For a recent defence of this view, see Siderits (2015) 
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end unless they are causally relevant to its production. This need not imply that x 
must be causally sufficient for y. It need merely imply that, for x to count as a means 
to y, x must (at the very least) be able make a difference to whether y occurs. This is 
one way to articulate the utilitarian assumption that the value of the relevant x (action, 
motive, attitude) depends on the value of the end it generates or contributes to 
producing.10  
At this point, however, utilitarian theories diverge. There is disagreement 
about the nature and class of relevant means (whether actions, motives, attitudes) as 
well as relevant ends (whether hedonic states or some other goods). There is also 
disagreement about whether the end must be actually or merely potentially generated 
for the evaluation of relevant means. The latter allows for the kind of hypothetical 
reasoning involved in decision-making (which requires the ability to determine what 
would be the right thing to do prior to action and thus prior to actual outcomes). The 
former is beholden to actual outcomes and thus evaluative status is only genuinely 
determined post fact. Utilitarians also disagree about how outcomes are evaluated; 
whether they need to be assessed in terms of some comparative and/or aggregative 
relation. For some, the value of the relevant x is judged on a case-by case basis (as in 
act-utilitarianism). For others, x has value only if it (actually or potentially) 
contributes to generating the best aggregation of valued outcomes. On traditional 
accounts, the best aggregation is equated with a maximal set. Thus, x will have value 
only if it causes more of the valued outcomes than any (possible agent-relative) 
alternative. In such case, evaluative status will not be determined simply by the nature 
                                                
10 Although I will use the language of consequents or ends being ‘generated’ or caused, it is important 
to recognise that a causal effect is not identical to a consequent or end. A ‘consequent’ is a component 
of a conditional and thus irreducibly related to an antecedent. As such it marks a logical relation rather 
than a causal relation. Nevertheless, talk of ‘actual’ or ‘potential’ consequents or ends tends to be 
framed as a concern with actual or probable products or outcomes. I shall simply note this ambiguity 
without attempting to resolve it. 
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of actual outcomes but in hypothetical relationship to alternative possibilities. 11 
Despite these variations, most utilitarians accept an instrumental analysis of 
evaluative status whereby the value of x is determined solely by its (actual or 
potential) relation to some valued y. While the ethical evaluation of x depends on the 
instrumental aspect of this relation (which is essentially normative and travels in the 
reverse direction to causation, from end to means rather than cause to effect), the fact 
of this instrumental relation obtaining is supervenient on an underlying causal relation 
(the fact that x can at least make a difference to the occurrence of y). Independent of 
this instrumental-causal relation, x is devoid of value.  
This much, I hope, is uncontroversial. Understood in these terms, it is easy to 
see how instrumental forms of consequentialism can be used to model the relation 
between the Eightfold Path and the Four Noble Truths. If we extend the class of 
relevant means to range over the various elements that comprise the Eightfold path, 
each can be justified as ‘right’ and thus proper aspects of the path in relation to some 
end towards which they function as means. Extending the class of relevant means in 
this way can accommodate Buddhist talk about virtues and the cultivation of various 
qualities. They would each count as good and right to the extent that they count as 
means to the relevant end and thus are causally relevant to its production. It might 
also seem that the metaphor of a ‘path’ naturally suggests this instrumental reading: 
i.e. one follows a path because one is trying to get somewhere. To where is one trying 
to get? One natural answer is: to nirvāṇa. What is nirvāṇa? On a straightforward 
reading, it is the state of complete cessation of suffering as articulated in the third 
noble truth. One might further argue that the relevant end is not agent-relative (viz. 
cessation of suffering for me) but, rather, universal and agent-neutral (viz. cessation of 
                                                
11 Some utilise this structure to advance forms of rule utilitarianism, according to which an act is right 
if it follows a rule that would bring about better outcomes if everyone followed it than otherwise. 
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suffering, in general and as such, for all sentient beings). How might this be justified? 
In relation to the Buddha’s doctrine of no-self (anātman) and dependent origination 
(pratītyasamutpāda). 
This instrumental analysis of the Four Noble Truths has several implications. 
First, as mentioned above, the instrumental analysis supervenes on causation. When 
generalized as an analysis of a Buddhist path, it follows that a proper aspect of the 
path is one that is causally related to the cessation of suffering and its value (as 
means) transfers from the value of this effect (as end). Suffering has negative value 
within a Buddhist framework; the cessation of suffering has positive value. On the 
assumption that the cessation of suffering is the goal of the Buddhist path, this 
instrumental analysis implies that wisdom (right view, right intention), modes of 
conduct (right speech, right action, right livelihood) and modes of mental discipline 
(right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration) have positive value (are ‘right’ or 
‘good’) just in case and to the extent that they are causally related to this positive state 
of affairs. Independent of their causal contribution to the cessation of suffering, they 
are devoid of value. 
Second, if we emphasise the causal underpinning of the instrumental relation, it 
might seem that once the end or goal is achieved, it no longer needs a cause, at which 
point the various aspects of the path will lose their purpose and value qua means and 
thus contributing causes. If this is right, it might then follow that once one achieves 
nirvāṇa (and thus the cessation of suffering) the relevant aspects of the path lose their 
point and value. Like a ladder no longer required once one has successfully climbed 
to one’s destination, the Eightfold path is neither required nor of value once the goal 
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has been achieved.12 This analysis might support certain transcendental accounts of 
nirvāṇa and Buddhahood. According to such accounts, the achievement of nirvāṇa is 
coextensive with a complete escape from saṃsāra; i.e. the cycle of karmic rebirth 
which is causally driven by actions and their effects. For some, when one achieves 
transcendent-nirvāṇa one entirely transcends the realm of causally efficacious action 
(karman). It would seem to follow, however, that a transcendent Buddha is not an 
agent and it thus makes no sense to speak of a Buddha’s good (compassionate, 
virtuous) actions.13 Those who wish to defend this view might find some meta-ethical 
support in the instrumental analysis of the Buddhist path. Realising the right view, 
engaging in good modes of living and mindfulness might thus be understood as 
necessary means for ordinary human beings to achieve transcendent-nirvāṇa but lose 
their point once this goal has been achieved. Once one achieves the goal of the 
Eightfold Path, once one has climbed to the top of the ladder, the ladder itself can be 
pushed away.  
	
A	Constitutive	Analysis	of	the	Buddhist	Path	
Those who defend a virtue ethical reconstruction of Buddhism emphasise the 
development of certain attitudes, capacities or mental states, the perfection of which 
are unified in a certain way of living as exemplified by a Buddha or a bodhisattva. 
                                                
12 This is aside from the value and purpose that the Buddhist path may have for someone else who has 
yet to achieve the goal of the path. However, nuance is still perhaps needed here. It is arguable, for 
instance, that purpose and value can come apart. A constituent of the Eightfold Path might still have 
value even if it no longer has a purpose in achieving the goal relative to which it is evaluated. 
However, this may depend on whether one thinks a causal relation ceases once its effect is fully 
actualized and how this bears on the status of some x as means. For instance, if some x must be able to 
make an actual causal difference to y’s occurring in order to count as a means to y, this condition 
cannot be satisfied in the the case of y being fully actualised. As a result, there is no basis for the 
transference of value from end to means and hence that x loses value once y occurs. If, however, it is 
sufficient that x must have been able to make such a difference (or did make such a difference) to count 
as a means to that end, then this problem can be averted.  
13 For a discussion of some problems that arise for this view, see Finnigan (2010/11, 2011a,b) 
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While the Buddhist canon offers several competing lists of the relevantly perfected 
attitudes (pāramitās), most Buddhist traditions and schools consider the following 
four ‘immeasurables’ (apramāṇa) to be characteristic of a Buddha’s mode of living; 
i.e. loving-kindness (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), empathetic joy (mudita), and 
equanimity (upekṣā). 
How are we to understand these attitudes, their cultivation and perfection, in 
relation to the goal of a Buddhist path? The instrumental analysis might seem to 
provide the most straightforward answer. They have value to the extent that they are 
means to generating the various aspects of the Eightfold Path, which, in turn, have 
value as means to the cessation of suffering, which is the goal of the path. It is only 
insofar as loving-kindness, compassion, empathetic joy or equanimity instrumentally 
cause us to (e.g.) engage in right actions, right speech and right modes of livelihood 
that they have positive value, where the ‘rightness’ of these modes of living is 
determined in instrumental-causal relation to the cessation of suffering.  
This is not the only way to analyse the relevance of these attitudes, however. 
They might alternatively be analysed in constitutive relation to the Buddhist path. 
There are several ways to analyse a constitution relation. The sense relevant to this 
paper is not a mere mereological sum. Rather, like the instrumental relation, it has a 
goal or object that is the basis for determining value. The crucial difference between 
these two kinds of relation, however, concerns whether the basis for determining 
value is an external effect or internal objective of that which is evaluated.14  
According to my analysis, the instrumental relation broadly supervenes on an 
underlying causal relation. If interpreted in efficient causal terms, it implies that the 
                                                
14 Although I am stipulating the terms ‘constitutive’ and ‘instrumental’ to the analyses provided in this 
paper, I recognize that these terms are not always used in these stipulated senses. For instance, the term 
‘instrumental’ is sometimes use to characterize all conditional relations and thus could be used to 
describe both analyses of goal-directed activities. ‘Constitutive’ can also be used to cover both (e.g. ‘x 
constitutes the path because it is internally/externally related to y’).  
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path and goal are separate and distinct and thus the basis of evaluation is external to 
the evaluated act. This is standardly assumed by classical hedonic utilitarians, for 
instance, who take it to be uncontroversial that there is an ontological distinction 
between actions and the hedonic states produced as a result. If extended to the 
Buddhist context, it follows that engaged aspects of the Buddhist path are separate 
and distinct contributing causes of nirvāṇa, relative to the production of which they 
obtain positive evaluative status. In this way, the basis of evaluation (nirvāṇa) is 
external to the evaluated objects (the various aspects of the Eightfold Path).  
According to a constitutive analysis, however, the goal of the Buddhist path is 
not a separate and distinct event that is caused by acquiring and engaging various 
modes of wisdom, living and mental discipline. Rather, it marks their point of 
perfection or completion (the telos) and thus is actualised in their very engagement. It 
is an objective which is internal to a way of living, rather than an effect that is 
external to and caused by the living of such a life.  
To grasp the difference, consider dancing and the goal of becoming a graceful 
dancer. This goal is teleological and internal to the relevant activity to the extent that 
it is actualised in the dancing rather than being an ontologically separate and distinct 
effect that is produced by dancing. Of course, one might seek to bring about certain 
effects as a result of being able to dance gracefully (such as entrancing a partner or 
winning a prize). However, this is merely to say that an action can have multiple 
goals, some internal and some external. Where the instrumental analysis views the 
Eightfold Path as a roadmap to some destination that is separate and distinct from 
one’s present location, the constitutive analysis views it as circumscribing a certain 
way of living; namely, one that consists of mutually reinforcing modes of 
understanding, conduct and mindful attention. The perfection of these distinct modes 
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of living is analysed in relation to the cultivation of the four immeasurable attitudes 
(loving-kindness, compassion, empathetic joy and equanimity). 
The four immeasurable attitudes, themselves, can be seen to provide a (partial) 
model for the constitutive analysis of a Buddhist ‘way’ of living.15 In contemporary 
discussions, these attitudes are often characterised as emotions. The nature of 
emotions is a matter of contemporary dispute. Some characterise emotions as simple 
and basic sensations akin to the phenomenal experience of bodily, physical pain. This 
characterisation is arguably equivalent to the Buddhist notion of vedanā. The four 
immeasurables are more complex. Each is an intentional attitude that is (a) about or 
directed towards certain kinds of objects construed in certain kinds of ways, and (b) 
made manifest in certain kinds of bodily and behavioural responses, where (a) and (b) 
are constitutive of the relevant attitude rather than related to it either as cause or 
effect. While the four immeasurable attitudes may involve phenomenally simple 
sensory elements, they are not reductively defined in terms of them. Arguably, much 
the same can be said for many varieties of emotion. 
To illustrate this point, consider fear. While the nature of fear is, itself, subject 
to much debate it is arguably not (or not simply) a bare, simple sensation like bodily, 
physical pain. Rather, there is reason to think that it is an intentional attitude that is 
about or directed towards some object. While the objects of fear differ between 
subjects, it is nevertheless the case that insofar as one experiences fear one is afraid of 
something. Moreover, the object of fear is not necessarily identical with its 
originating or triggering cause. Consider, for instance, a subject who was once 
attacked by a dog and subsequently feels fear whenever they pass the building where 
the event occurred. It seems mistaken to say that the subject is afraid of the building. 
                                                
15 I say ‘partial’ because although I will argue that they are necessarily oriented with regards to an 
intentional object, this is not exactly the same as saying they are goal directed.   
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It seems more correct to say that they are afraid of dogs (or, perhaps, being harmed by 
dogs, which is an unwanted possibility about which the subject experiences some 
agential uncertainty or lack of control) where this fear is occasioned or triggered by 
the perception of the building (in causal association with the memory of being 
attacked, which may have been the originating cause of the attitude). Both the 
originating and triggering cause of the subject’s fear of dogs are external to and, in 
principle, dissociable from this attitude. The object of the subject’s fear, by contrast, 
that of which the subject is afraid (i.e. dogs) is internal and constitutive of the attitude 
itself.  
Of course, the relevant attitude would not be that of fear if it did not manifest in 
certain kinds of bodily and behavioural responses. Physiologically, the manifestation 
of fear may involve a rush of adrenaline, phenomenologically apparent in the form of 
bodily trembling or increased heart rate or sweating. Behaviourally, fear may manifest 
in variations of ‘freeze, flight, fight’ responses as subtle as an almost indiscernible 
increase in walking pace or as obvious as crossing to the far side of the street. These 
bodily, behavioural manifestations are not separate and distinct causal effects of fear, 
understood as a simple and discrete bodily feeling. Rather, the attitude of fear is a 
bodily, behavioural orientation towards (or mode of recoiling from) certain objects.16  
The four immeasurables can be subjected to a similar analysis. Compassion is 
canonically characterised as an attitude of aspiring for the diminishment of suffering 
(in oneself or another). Loving-kindness is characterised as an attitude of aspiring for 
well-being and happiness (for oneself or another). Empathic joy is an attitude of 
rejoicing in the happiness of others and the relevant sense of equanimity is a clear-
minded, tranquil mode of responding to the vicissitudes of life. Each is an intentional 
                                                
16 This is not to deny that the ways in which fear manifests may differ between subjects and may be 
complicated in various ways when other attitudes are simultaneously triggered. 
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attitude oriented to certain kinds of objects construed in certain kinds of ways. Each, 
once sufficiently cultivated, is robustly dispositional in the sense that they reliably 
manifest in relevant kinds of bodily, behavioural response in relevant kinds of 
circumstances. The ethical conduct (śīla) component of the Eightfold Path (i.e. right 
speech, action, livelihood) might be understood as three primary ways of manifesting 
these attitudes and it is relative to the expression of these attitudes that they are 
justified as constituents of the path.17 
 
A	qualification	and	refinement	of	the	framing	question	
I have claimed that a nominal distinction between instrumentality and constitution is 
widely used in Buddhist ethics literature and is broadly associated with utilitarianism 
and some form of virtue ethics. I have demonstrated how these evaluative relations, 
once analysed, provide for two distinct meta-ethical accounts of the normative 
grounds of Buddhist Ethics. There are complications, however, in associating these 
analyses with current work in normative ethical theory.  
Contemporary consequentialists, for instance, do not limit themselves to 
instrumentalism about evaluative status but, rather, allow themselves a much broader 
range of evaluative relations. Indeed, it would seem that many consequentialists 
include as consequentialist all evaluative relations which can be logically construed as 
consequential (i.e. all claims of conditional form). Take, for instance, ordered list 
                                                
17  How might the remaining aspects of the Eightfold Path fit with this analysis? The wisdom 
components (prajñā) might be justified in relation to the intentional object of these attitudes. The 
notion of intention (saṃkalpa) has a broad interpretive range. Right intention might be plausibly 
construed as correctness in the intentional object towards which one’s attitudes are oriented, where the 
obtaining of such correctness is influenced by obtaining the right view (dṛṣṭi). While the value of right 
view and intention are justified relative to truth, one might argue that they are relevant constituents of 
the Eightfold Path insofar as they help shape the attitudes that are expressed in our modes of living. 
The concentration components (samādhi) might be similarly justified by their role in facilitating the 
cultivation of wisdom and thus correction of the intentional objects of the attitudes expressed by modes 
of ethical conduct.  
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theory and welfarist consequentialism. Unlike classical utilitarianism, these forms of 
consequentialism do not consider hedonic states of pleasure and pain to be the only 
intrinsic goods. Welfarist consequentialism, in particular, includes anything that is 
thought to have genuine and non-derivative significance for well-being. Moreover, 
according to this view, some quality or character trait is considered good to the extent 
that it contributes to, and thus is properly constitutive of, well-being. Charles 
Goodman defends welfarist consequentialism as the best reconstruction of Buddhist 
ethics.18 It would seem, however, that the metaphysical foundation for this particular 
form of consequentialism better fits the constitutive analysis that we have attributed to 
virtue ethics than the instrumental analysis that underlies traditional forms of 
utilitarianism. 
Consider also recent criticisms of virtue ethical reconstructions of Buddhism. 
While at one time quite popular, these reconstructions are now often strongly rejected 
as incompatible with the metaphysical underpinnings of Buddhist thought. 19  The 
reason typically offered is that Aristotelian forms of virtue ethics are person-centred 
in a sense that assumes some essential property of self as evaluative grounds of the 
various attitudes and character traits that are expressed in action, where this assumed 
essential self is taken to be incompatible with the Buddhist doctrine of no-self 
(anātman). 20  However, as with contemporary consequentialism, there is much 
diversity in contemporary virtue ethical views. Not all contemporary forms of virtue 
ethics are Aristotelian, neo-Aristotelian and/or person-centred.21 And even those that 
are need not presuppose a permanent, unchanging, essential self (ātman) as the 
                                                
18 See Goodman (2009, 2013, 2015) 
19 According to Goodman (2009), for instance, no version of virtue ethics can provide a viable model 
of Buddhist ethics. A similar view is advanced by Siderits (2015) 
20 See Goodman (2013), Siderits (2015), and Garfield & Priest (2015) 
21 While some Buddhist scholars note this point, few go on to actually engage the relevant differences 
in contemporary virtue ethical theory. Examples of non-Aristotelian approaches to virtue ethics can be 
found in Phillipa Foot (2001), Christine Swanton (2003), Lisa Tessman (2005). 
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metaphysical foundation for evaluating character traits. Similar to welfarist 
consequentialism, it is open to defenders of, say, a neo-Aristotelian approach to ethics 
to insist that virtues are character traits that, when perfected or made excellent, 
mutually constitute and sustain well-being or a good way of living (eudaimonia). If 
plausible, a virtue ethical reconstruction of Buddhist ethics on a constitutive 
metaphysical foundation need not be inconsistent with Buddhist views on self.  
Given these considerations, it might seem that there is no settled answer to the 
question of which contemporary normative ethical theory (consequentialism or virtue 
ethics) Buddhist thought best approximates. The comparative task cuts both ways; a 
proper answer is beholden on Western philosophy to provide a clearly demarcated 
basis for comparison. And Western philosophers disagree about how to distinguish 
these theories. This is not to deny the potential fruitfulness of comparative analysis in 
terms of some theory as defended by some Western philosopher. The above 
considerations nevertheless reveal the limitations of this approach. 
An alternative approach our framing question, however, is to set aside the 
normative labels (consequentialism and virtue ethics) and focus, instead, on the 
instrumental and constitutive analyses that some versions of these normative theories 
metaphysically presuppose. While it is arguable that the difference between (e.g.) 
welfarist consequentialism and well-being based virtue ethical theory might, in the 
end, be merely verbal, the relational structures analyzed above are substantively 
distinct, diverging over whether the basis for evaluation is internal or external to what 
is evaluated and potentially requiring distinct arguments to justify.  
If we take this alternative approach, however, we still face the question of 
whether one of these two analyses is more correct, fundamental or better represents 
the ‘spirit’ of Buddhist ethical thought than the other. Is there a singular best meta-
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ethical analysis of Buddhist thought or are both analyses provided above equally 
legitimate? How might we settle this issue?  
One possibility is to assess whether either of these analyses are systematically 
consistent with Buddhist thought in various respects. There seem to be at least three 
respects in which such consistency could be tested. 
(1) Consistency with the Buddha’s teaching on the Four Noble Truths; 
(2) Consistency with at least some established Buddhist metaphysical and 
epistemological theory; 
(3) A plausible reconstruction of at least some canonical Buddhist text. 
Why these three criteria? I take (1) to be obvious insofar as the Four Noble Truths 
comes closest to being a central tenet of Buddhism and thus common element 
underlying the diversity of philosophical views. What about (2)? Since these meta-
ethical analyses are contemporary, philosophical reconstructions of the Buddhist path, 
their legitimacy will, in part, depend on whether they can be systematically related to 
more established philosophical views within the Buddhist canon. Historical Buddhist 
thinkers provided highly sophisticated metaphysical and epistemological analyses of 
the Buddha’s teachings on non-self and dependent origination. It is reasonable to 
suppose that a plausible reconstruction of Buddhist ethics should be consistent with 
some such analysis. Indeed, as noted above, we already see some rational 
reconstructions being dismissed precisely because they are taken to be inconsistent 
with these metaphysical commitments (on some understanding). Finally, it is 
reasonable to consider whether there is any textual evidence to support either analysis 
in canonical Buddhist texts that are explicitly concerned with ethical conduct. Hence 
(3).  
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Establishing whether and to what extent the instrumental and constitutive 
analyses of the Buddhist path are consistent with Buddhist thought in all three 
respects is a considerable task beyond the scope of what can be achieved here. 
Showing that they both satisfy (2), in particular, would require considering how these 
analyses might systematically relate to the complexities of some Buddhist 
philosophical system (Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka). 22  The 
remainder of this article will, instead, focus on providing some reasons to think that 
both of these analyses might satisfy (1) and (3).  
	
Comparative	assessment:	consistency	with	the	Four	Noble	Truths	
The instrumental analysis seems to provide a relatively straightforward reading of the 
relation between the Eightfold Path and the Four Noble Truths. On this view, each of 
the various elements that comprise the Eightfold path is justified as ‘right’ and thus a 
proper aspect of the path to the extent that they contribute to generating the end of 
nirvāṇa, where this is understood as the cessation of suffering.  
By contrast, one might worry that the constitutive analysis of the Buddhist 
Path either misconstrues or does not take seriously enough the centrality of suffering 
to the Four Noble Truths. Traditional metaphors of these truths conceive of the 
Eightfold Path as a remedy for the disease of suffering that is discovered by the first 
truth, the causes of which diagnosed by the second and the possibility of a cure 
promised by the third. It could be objected that the constitutive analysis has little 
bearing on the actual cessation of suffering aside from an aspiration for its 
                                                
22 It may also require considering the viability of these respective analyses. For instance, Madhyamaka 
thinkers strongly critique Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. If one or other of our analyses can only be 
justified as consistent with Sautrāntika, for instance, the question will remain as to whether that is 
sufficient justification in view of these Madhyamaka critiques. These issues become very complicated 
very quickly. 
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diminishment. That is, while the cessation of suffering might be an internal objective 
of various attitudes, it does not seem to be a state of affairs that is actually generated 
as a result of following the Buddhist path. If this is right, the constitutive analysis 
might seem to be disconnected from, and thus inconsistent with, this central Buddhist 
idea, the fact of which may give reason to prefer the instrumental analysis.  
There are at least two approaches available to the defender of the constitutive 
analysis of the Buddhist path in response to this challenge. First, compatible with this 
analysis is the idea that increased perfection in attitudes is co-extensive with an actual 
decrease in suffering. The cessation of suffering need not be conceived as a separate 
and distinct product of the modes of behaviour constitutive of these attitudes but 
might be, itself, constitutive of a life oriented by these attitudes. It is arguable, for 
instance, that a life lived in ways that are compassionate, loving, empathetic, and 
equanimous is pleasurable in a distinct sense that is incompatible with suffering. 
Even if this is granted, one might still worry that this response only applies to 
the agent who is living such a life without any direct implications for the cessation of 
suffering of others. Given the Buddha’s emphasis on dependent origination and non-
self in his discussion of the second noble truth, it might be argued that an analysis of 
the third noble truth that did not extend the range of diminished suffering beyond the 
scope of an individual agent is problematic. The only way for this to be achieved, it 
could be argued, would be if the constitutive analysis were embedded within the 
instrumental analysis. That is, one might concede that the personal cessation of 
suffering might be constitutive of a certain perfected way of living, but nevertheless 
insist that this way of living must be instrumentally related to the global cessation of 
suffering which is the proper scope of Buddhist concern. Moreover, if utilitarianism is 
rightly associated with the instrumental analysis and virtue ethics with the 
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constitutive, the above could be used as an argument to support an analysis of 
Buddhist virtue ethics as ultimately embedded within a utilitarian framework.  
This is a difficult argument to rebut. However, while not decisive, it might be 
countered by arguing that the relevant kind of pleasure can transfer to the objects of 
these attitudes if one conceives of the modes of behaviour that are constituent of these 
attitudes as purposive events with their own constitutive objectives. Consider, for 
instance, the simple act of smiling. A smile may result in making someone else smile, 
where this is a separate and distinct effect. However, the act of smiling also brings 
about a material change in the world; namely, a particular change in facial expression 
(i.e. mouth curved upwards, eyes shining, eyelids slightly narrowed). This material 
change is not a separate and distinct effect of smiling but is internal to it to the extent 
that the act of smiling would not count as the act of smiling unless this particular 
change in facial expression occurred.23 The external effect of causing someone else to 
smile is dissociable from the act of smiling, but the particular change in facial 
expression not. Now consider a more complex action that one might categorize as 
manifesting compassion, such as comforting a crying friend with a warm embrace. 
Some would argue that the compassionate action consists in the attempt to alleviate 
suffering; i.e. what one is trying to achieve, irrespective of whether one succeeds. On 
this analysis, one counts as comforting one’s friend irrespective of whether one’s 
friend is actually comforted. It might alternatively be argued, however, that the friend 
being comforted and thus no longer suffering in the relevant respect marks the point 
of completion of the action of ‘comforting one’s friend’. As such, the friend being 
comforted is constitutive or internal to the action itself. If this is plausible, then 
bringing about a material change in the object of one’s compassion may be 
                                                
23 Similarly, dancing would not count as dancing unless there was some kind of movement in a body, 
which is a material change in the world. 
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constitutive of a behavioural manifestation of this attitude rather than a separate and 
distinct effect of having acted compassionately. And, if this is plausible, then bringing 
about the cessation of suffering in the objects of one’s immeasurable attitudes might 
be considered constitutive of the behavioural expression of those attitudes rather than 
a separate and distinct causal effect.  
This solution has some rather strong implications. In particular, it would seem 
that the nature of an action might be indeterminate until it reaches its point of 
completion. This may be neither apparent nor an issue for actions that have a short 
temporal duration, such as smiling and comforting friends. In such case, the material 
change in the world occurs at the time of, or shortly after, the initiation of the action 
and thus the action is complete almost as soon as it is begun.24 If the object of 
compassion is the alleviation of suffering of all sentient beings, however, it would 
seem to follow that an action aimed at this objective would not reach its point of 
completion and thus not come to be until all suffering has been alleviated. This seems 
unintuitive. The concern might be alleviated, however, if this complex action is 
identified as a temporally extended mode of living analysable into more discrete 
action parts with their own constitutive objectives. Hence, while the mode of living 
that manifests mahakaruṇā (i.e. great compassion oriented towards the alleviation of 
suffering of all sentient beings), may not be properly instantiated until the point at 
which all suffering is alleviated, this temporally extended mode of living might 
nevertheless be analysed into more discrete and relatively more quickly completable 
action parts, one of which may consist in comforting a crying friend with a warm 
embrace. 
                                                
24  The idea of an action reaching its point of completion by achieving its objective need not be 
identified with a stopping point. The act of ‘leisurely strolling’ might be said to achieve its objective at 
the very point at which it is begun, where this fact does not mark its stopping point. Similarly, with the 
act of smiling; one does not necessarily cease smiling at the point at which one’s face changes its 
demeanor in the relevant way.   
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Clearly the story of how the constitutive analysis is consistent with the Four 
Noble Truths is more complicated than the one that provided for the instrumental 
analysis. But complicated does not mean false or unjustified. If coherent, then there is 
reason to think that the constitutive analysis can satisfy (1) for counting as a plausible 
analysis of Buddhist ethical thought. 
	
Comparative	assessment:	textual	analysis	
I shall close by briefly considering whether our two meta-ethical analyses might be 
consistent with some canonical Buddhist texts concerned with ethical conduct and 
thus whether they can satisfy (3). 
Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA) is a touchstone for recent reconstructions 
of Buddhist ethical thought as a normative theory. Śāntideva is a Madhyamaka 
Buddhist thinker in the Mahāyāna tradition and this text is thought to best exemplify 
Mahāyāna values. Central to this tradition is the notion of a bodhisattva and an 
interpretation of the Eightfold Path as a bodhisattva path. A bodhisattva, according to 
this tradition, is one who has resolved to remain in the realm of suffering (saṃsāra) to 
help liberate all sentient beings from suffering.  
It might seem that certain passages in BCA are best read as suggesting a 
constitutive analysis of the bodhisattva path. A central theme of this text is the 
cultivation of an Awakened Mind (bodhicitta), which is achieved by completing two 
stages in mental development. The first stage is called ‘aspirational bodhicitta’ 
(praṇidhicitta, 1.15), which consists of the resolution to become a bodhisattva for the 
sake of releasing all sentient beings from suffering. Śāntideva describes the person 
with this attitude as being like one who “desires to go” (1.16) but is not yet going; like 
one who has resolved to live compassionately but does not yet express compassion in 
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their conduct. By contrast, the person “who is going” and thus actually expresses 
compassion in their conduct is identified as ‘engaging bodhicitta’ (prasthānacitta, 
1.15). Śāntideva characterises this second stage of bodhicitta as a superior level of 
moral development (1.17). While not entirely clear in the text, the transition from 
aspirational to engaging bodhicitta arguably involves transforming the initial 
resolution (to be compassionate; to live compassionately) into the intentional 
(dispositional and thus behavioural) attitude of compassion (karuṇā) and eventually 
great compassion (mahakaruṇā) supported by one’s gradual attainment of right 
understanding and reinforced by ever-deepening meditative practices. The goal of the 
bodhisattva path may thus seem to be internal to the practices and attitudes that 
constitute such a way of living in the sense that it seems to mark their point of 
perfection. 
Further support for this constitutive analysis of BCA might be found in 
Śāntideva’s response to the question: “If the perfection of generosity consists in 
making the universe free from poverty, how can previous Protectors have acquired it, 
when the world is still poor, even today?” (5.9) Answer: “…the perfection is the 
mental attitude itself” (5.10) It is also reinforced by Śāntideva’s reflections on the 
limitations of individual agency. “Where is there hide to cover the whole world? The 
wide world can be covered with hide enough for a pair of shoes alone” (5.13); 
“...since I cannot control external events, I will control my mind.” (5.14) Bodhicitta, 
on this analysis, does not cause one to become a bodhisattva. Perfected bodhicitta (i.e. 
the fully Awakened Mind) is characteristic of the perfected mode of living that is 
conveniently designated as that of a ‘bodhisattva’.  
Despite this textual evidence for a constitutive analysis of the bodhisattva path, 
BCA also provides textual support for the view that the evaluative status of the 
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‘bodhisattva way’ is ultimately justified in instrumental relation to the cessation of 
suffering thereby caused. This is implied by Śāntideva’s remark that “The greatness 
of the intent comes not from itself but rather from its effect, and so the greatness is 
equal” (5.14). Śāntideva also suggests that we can overlook a moral code at the time 
of giving (5.42), where this seems to imply that the grounds for evaluative status 
might be external to (rather than constitutive of) the perfection of generosity, which 
better fits an instrumental analysis. Finally, his argument for altruism in Chapter 8, 
based on the non-existence of a permanent self, is perhaps most intuitively read in 
instrumental terms. He writes:  
“The continuum of consciousness, like a queue, and the combination of 
constituents, like an army, are not real. The person who experiences suffering does not 
exist. To whom will the suffering belong? Without exception, no sufferings belong to 
anyone. They must be warded off simply because they are suffering. Why is any 
limitation put on this? If one asks why suffering should be prevented, no one disputes 
that! If it must be prevented, then all of it must be. If not, then this goes for oneself as 
for everyone” (8.101-103).25 
Much contemporary discussion about the nature of Buddhist ethics focuses on 
negotiating and attempting to systematise Śāntideva various remarks. Some of these 
tensions might be construed as orienting around the issue of whether Śāntideva’s 
Bodhicaryāvatāra presupposes an instrumental or constitutive analysis of the 
bodhisattva path. However these particular interpretive issues are resolved, they need 
not be taken to decisively settle which analysis of the nature of a Buddhist path is the 
best reconstruction of Buddhist thought on ethical matters. Matters appear quite 
different if we take a different Buddhist text as our point of departure.  
                                                
25 There is much controversy about how these verses are best analysed. For a detailed discussion of the 
relevant issues, see Cowherds (2015) and Finnigan (2017).  
  23 
Consider, for instance, the less studied and much more esoteric writings of the 
Japanese Zen Buddhist, Dōgen.26 When training as a Tendai monk, Dōgen became 
puzzled about the doctrine of ‘original enlightenment’ (本覚	hongaku). According to 
this Tendai doctrine, all sentient beings have buddha-nature, where this is understood 
as the view that all sentient beings are already and primordially enlightened. This idea 
is derived from the Tathāgatagarbha tradition of Buddhist thought rather than the 
Prajñāpāramitā tradition that informs the Madhyamaka of Śāntideva. If one were to 
accept this Tendai idea of buddha-nature, Dōgen puzzled, what is the point of 
following a Buddhist path aimed at achieving enlightenment given that the relevant 
causal effect appears to have been already achieved?27 Indeed, the very attempt to 
achieve that which is already possessed would seem to be counter-productive given 
that it may actually diminish or lead us away from our primordial buddha-nature. 
These reflections did not lead Dōgen to reject Buddhist practice, however. Rather, 
they inspired the idea that enlightenment is not a transcendental state that lies beyond 
ordinary life and is caused by following a Buddhist path. Rather, it manifests itself in 
everyday living. “When you find your place where you are, practice occurs, 
actualizing the fundamental point. When you find your way at this moment, practice 
occurs, actualizing the fundamental point.” (Translation from Tanahashi (1985) p. 
72.) Dōgen might be reasonably understood as rejecting the instrumental analysis of 
the Buddhist path in favour of a constitutive analysis. He does not deny that 
enlightenment is something to be achieved. Rather, this achievement is conceived as 
an actualization that occurs in one’s ordinary mode of living and not as a causal effect 
of having lived a certain kind of life. “In your study of flowing, if you imagine the 
                                                
26 I owe the following analysis of Dōgen to Koji Tanaka.  
27 “Both exoteric and esoteric teachings explain that a person in essence has true dharma nature and is 
originally a body of “Buddha nature.” If so, why do all buddhas in the past, present, and future arouse 
the wish for and seek enlightenment?” (Translated and quoted in Tanahashi (1985) p. 4 (Tanahashi, 
Kazuaki (ed.) (1985) Moon in a Dewdrop, Farrar: North Point Press.)) 
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objective to be outside yourself and that you flow and move through hundreds and 
thousands of worlds, for hundreds, thousands, and myriads of eons, you have not 
devotedly studied the buddha way.” (p. 80) 
Clearly much more would need to be said to establish that Śāntideva and Dōgen 
actually presupposed one or other of the above analyses of the Buddhist path. 
Nevertheless, from this brief reflection it seems clear that the instrumental and 
constitutive analyses of the Buddhist path could each be rendered systematically 
consistent with some canonical Buddhist texts concerned with ethical conduct. This is 
not to say that both are equally legitimate. Nor is it to pass judgment on the respective 
legitimacy of a Madhyamaka Buddhist conception of ethical matters, inspired by the 
Prajñāpāramitā tradition, over Zen Buddhist conceptions, inspired by the 
Tathāgatagarbha. It does suggest, however, that adjudicating between these two 
analyses by reference to Buddhist canonical texts may well depend on how one 
negotiates the philosophical and cultural issues that differentiates Buddhist traditions. 
It also shows the dangers of unduly focusing on a limited set of examples. Even if 
compelling arguments could be provided to show that (e.g.) Śāntideva’s 
Bodhicaryāvatāra is most compelling read in terms of one or the other of the above 
analyses of the Buddhist path, further argument is required to justify why one should 
prefer Śāntideva’s analysis over that of (e.g.) Dōgen. These issues cannot be readily 
resolved by the simple assumption of the Buddha’s teachings of the Four Noble 
Truths and Eightfold Path. 
	
Conclusion	
Contemporary philosophers engaged in the project of explaining the nature of 
Buddhist ethics as a normative ethical theory often assume that there is a single and 
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unified ‘spirit’ of Buddhist thought that ultimately determines what matters with 
respect to the application, flexibility, and potential revision of rules of ethical conduct. 
This common core ‘spirit’ of Buddhist ethics is assumed to be grounded in the 
relation between ethical conduct and the goal of the Eightfold Path as characterized 
by the Four Noble Truths.    
In this paper I have demonstrated that there are (at least) two distinct ways of 
analysing the nature of a path relative to a goal, where these analyses afford two 
distinct ways of understanding the nature of a Buddhist path. I have also provided 
reasons for thinking that both can be rendered plausible in terms that are 
systematically consistent with the Buddha’s teaching of the Four Noble Truths and 
canonical Buddhist texts concerned with ethical practice. This is not to say that, in the 
final analysis, both analyses of the nature of a Buddhist path and thus that all rational 
reconstructions grounded on their bases are equally legitimate. There may well be a 
correct position on these issues. Nevertheless, I have established that the tensions 
between these competing rational reconstructions are sufficiently complex to resist an 
easy resolution into a singular and homogeneous position on the nature of Buddhist 
ethics.  
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